Skip to main content

Home

The Leeds Logic group

Mathematical logic, a young subject, has developed over the last 30 years into an amalgam of fast-moving disciplines, each with its own sophisticated techniques. These are linked by profound common concerns, around definability, decidability, effectiveness and computability, the nature of the continuum, and foundations. Some branches are highly multidisciplinary and force the researcher to be fully conversant with other fields (e.g. algebra, computer science).

The Logic Group at the University of Leeds is one of the largest and most active worldwide, with a long uninterrupted tradition dating back to 1951, when its founder Martin Löb moved to Leeds. It has an international reputation for research in most of the main areas of mathematical logic - computability theory, model theory, set theory, proof theory, and in applications to algebra, analysis, number theory and theoretical computer science.

More details about the current grants, PhD students, and research interests are on our Research page.

Upcoming events

Greg Restall (University of St Andrews)

Location: MALL
Title: Natural Deduction Proof for Substructural, Constructive and Classical Logics

Since the 1990s, we have seen how to understand a very wide range of logical systems (classical logic, intuitionistic logic, dual intuitionistic logic, relevant logics, linear logic, the Lambek calculus, affine logic, orthologic and more) by way of the distinction between operational and structural rules. We can have one set of rules for a connective (say, conjunction, negation, or the conditional) in a sequent calculus, and get different logical behaviour depending on the shape of the sequents allowed and the structural rules governing those sequents.

In this talk, I will consider the relationship between the “big four” traditional substructural logics—intuitionistic, relevant, affine and linear—corresponding to the four options for including or excluding the structural rules of weakening and contraction, in the setting of Gentzen/Prawitz-style natural deduction proofs for implication and the simply typed λ calculus. Such a natural deduction setting—in which proofs have any number of premises and a single conclusion—has a natural bias toward constructive, or intuitionistic logic.

I will show how the choice of whether to “go classical”, expanding the structural context to allow for more than one formula in positive position is orthogonal to the choice of the other structural rules, so that even in the context of natural deduction proofs, the familiar pair of traditional implication introduction and elimination rules gives rise to eight different propositional logics, four of which are “classical” and four of which are “constructive”. Furthermore, the familiar double-negation translation of classical logic inside intuitionistic logic generalises to the other three classical/constructive pairings.

I will explain these results, and, if there is time, I will end the talk with some reflections on what this might mean for the relationship between classical and constructive reasoning.

Angus Matthews (Leeds)

Location: MALL
Title: The F-adjacency Graph, Part 2
 

In this talk, we will construct a locally finite, bounded exponent group with an infinite F-adjacency graph. This resolves an open question of Mayhew.

Jindrich Zapletal (University of Florida)

Location: MALL

View all Events